State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 3, 1981 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
2-3-1981 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from February 3, 1981 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 
3, 1981 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/229 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SPRING VALLEY POLICEMEN'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
•and-
VILLAGE OF SPRING VALLEY, 
Charging Party, 
//2A-2/3/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4856 
ARTHUR MOSKOFF, ESQ., for Charging .Party 
DRANOFF, DAVIS, KRUSE, RESNICK & FIELDS 
(RAYMOND KRUSE, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
The charge herein was filed by the Village of Spring 
Valley (Village). It alleges that the Village of Spring Valley 
Policemen;'s„BeneMlent/;Asspc.iatipn: (PBA) violated its duty to negoti-
ate in good faith. The Village charges that PBA has: 
1. Made unreasonable demands for the express 
purpose of frustrating negotiations and forcing 
the dispute into arbitration; and 
2. Presented nonmandatory subjects to the 
arbitrator. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge and the matter comes to 
us on the exceptions of the Village. 
The hearing officer requested an offer of proof from the 
Village in support of its allegation that PBA was attempting to 
frustrate negotiations in order to compel arbitration. The 
Village responded that it was prepared to prove that in past nego-j 
tiations PBA had submitted demands which it knew to be unaccept-
able and which were designed to be dropped after those demands 
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forced the dispute into arbitration. Moreover, in the instant 
negotiations, according to the Village, PBA discarded some of its 
demands after its petition for arbitration and the charge herein 
was fil^ d.--. 
The hearing officer determined that, even with the offer 
of proof, the charge does not set forth a violation and she did 
"nTTt"Irold ~a~hea^ ^ T 
argues that the refusal of the hearing officer to hold a hearing 
was reversible .error ..•„ 
We affirm the ruling of the hearing officer. Rule 204.1 
(b)(3) of this Board provides that a charge shall contain a 
statement of the facts constituting the violation. Instead of 
alleging facts here, the Village merely alleged a conclusion. 
When given an opportunity to present an offer of proof which 
should state the facts, it restated its conclusion, albeit in 
somewhat more detail. The restatement, however, did not consti-
tute a statement of facts which would compel a hearing. 
In her decision, the hearing officer rejected the 
Village's allegation that four demands of PBA were for nonmanda-
tory subjects of negotiation. The Village now asserts in its 
exceptions that the hearing officer was in error with respect to 
each of the four demands. 
Of the four demands in question, one deals with personal 
leave and another with sick leave. In its exceptions and sup-
porting memorandum, the Village acknowledges that this Board has 
already determined that similar demands constitute mandatory sub-
jects of negotiation and it makes no attempt to distinguish the 
demands herein from the similar demands that have been ruled upon. 
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Neither does the Village make any argument that the prior deci-
sions of this Board should be overruled. Its contention that the 
demands for personal leave and sick leave are not mandatory sub-
jects of negotiation is simply not supported. Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the hearing officer with respect to these 
two demands. 
- .The—two..- .other demands .of._ P.BA.. require, .a. jmox.e.._s_p.e.ciiiic ..... 
response. In one of the demands, it asks for premium pay to com-
pensate police officers for particular risks or difficulties en-
countered in the course of their work. For example, it asks for 
premium pay of $90 per shift to be divided among the police offi-
cers assigned to the shift whenever the number of uniformed offi-
cers assigned to the shift falls below six. It also asks for 
premium pay of $5.00 per shift for an officer who is not provided 
with a portable radio in sufficient working order to reach head-
quarters and for an officer who is assigned a vehicle without 
power windows. The hearing officer noted that demands for premi-
um pay have been held by this. Board to constitute mandatory sub-
1 
jects of negotiation.
 % S 
In addressing these decisions, the Village argues that the 
demand herein is not^ a legitimate one for premium pay, but is 
rather an improper one for a penalty to be imposed upon the 
Village when it exercises its managerial prerogatives. The propo-
sition of law advanced by the Village is that a demand is improper 
if. it sets up a system of penalties primarily designed to prohibit 
the public employer from exercising its statutory responsibilities 
even if, on its face, the demand is for premium pay. j 
i 
i 
! 
1 See Town of Haverstraw, 11 PERB 13109 (1978) and IAFF Local 
189, 11 PERB 113087 (1978). I 
I 
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2 
This proposition of law is correct, but there is no evi-
dence in the record that makes it applicable here. All premium 
pay provisions impose some costs upon an employer and thus dis-
courage some conduct. It does not follow, however, that these 
provisions constitute penalties. For a premium pay provision to j 
be deemed a penalty, it must be shown that the provision bears no j 
f eas^hl^Te ~rlTL^ 
a£fecting:'.workiiig -.conditions which, it' is. designed to compensate-.'. 
There Is ho' such showing In the record before us. 
The remaining demand is that the Village match U.S. sav-
ings bonds purchased by unit employees for their own benefit, up 
to $225 per year. In her decision, the hearing officer determined 
that the savings bonds that would be thus provided to unit 
employees would constitute compensation and is, therefore, a man-
datory subject of negotiation. She based this decision on Town of 
Havers t raw, 12 PERB 1f3064 (1979) , aff' d Haver straw v. Newman, 
75 AD2d 874 (2nd Dept., 1980), 13 PERB 1(7006. In Haver.straw, we 
held that legal insurance, like health insurance or group life 
Insurance, is a form of compensation and that a union may seek j 
such compensation in negotiations even though the risks protected 
against by the insurance are not job related. We ruled that the 
form of compensation sought is not relevant to its status as a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
. ^ 
( 
2 Lynnbrook.PBA,. 1Q::PERB:113067 (1977,), a p p e a l e d on o t h e r g rounds and I 
affirmed Lynbrook v. PERB, 64 AD2d 902 (2nd Dept., 1978), 
11 PERB 117012, a f f ^ d 48 NY2d 398 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 12 PERB 117021. 
i i 
• 
I 
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In support of its exceptions, the Village argues that 
PBA's demand "is not a mandatory subject of negotiation [but] is 
prohibited by the Constitution as a gift...." This argument does 
not properly comprehend the nature of collective negotiations. 
In collective negotiations employees seek various forms of compen-
sation in return for the services that they perform. Some forms 
of payment, other than salaries, might constitute gifts were they 
provided gratuitously and not for services rendered. When pro-
vided pursuant to a collectively negotiated contract and in returr 
for services rendered to the employer, there is consideration for 
the payments and they constitute compensation. Inland Steel Co. 
v. NLRB, 170 F2d 247 (1948), cert, den. on this issue, 336. US 960 
While the form of compensation sought by PBA here is unusual, it 
is for PBA to decide whether to seek it instead of some more 
common benefit. The Village may, of course, object during nego-
tiations to the benefit sought by PBA, but that goes to its sub-
stance and not to its negotiability. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 3, 1981 
---zfcajp £ AtL 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
* i /CO 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT JERVIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
JJDM^XHQMAS^McANDREW,^ 
CHARGING PARTY. 
JAMES SANDNER, ESQ. (NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel} for Respondent 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, pro se 
In January 1978, John Thomas McAndrew applied for a sab-
batical for the 1978-79 school year. His application was denied 
by his employer, the Port Jervis City School District (District) 
in March, 1978. McAndrew. protested the action of the District 
by filing a grievance, which was denied. .The Port Jervis 
Teachers Association (Association) then served a demand for arbi-
tration upon the District and a hearing was scheduled for May 29, 
i 
1979. That hearing was cancelled on May 24, 1979 by the Associ- J 
I 
ation when it settled the grievance to its own satisfaction. Thej 
] 
settlement granted McAndrew a sabbatical leave for the 1979-80 
school year. This did not satisfy McAndrew, who complained that 
the settlement did not make him whole. j 
At the mid-June meeting of the Association, its president 
advised McAndrew that it had no objection to his carrying his 
grievance further on his own. On June 4, 1979, however, the 
Association, through a New York State United Teachers Field Rep-
G724 I 
TDb-lI3/8± 
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resentative, had taken a different position in a letter to the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) confirming the withdrawal 
of the demand for arbitration. In that letter it noted that 
McAndrew was dissatisfied with the cancellation of the arbitra-
tion and that he was seeking to pursue arbitration on his own. 
It asserted that McAndrew had no right to proceed to arbitration 
-
uwrthout,"at^fe 
Association". 
McAndrew did not receive a copy of this letter until 
January 30, 1980. He did, however, receive a copy of a second 
letter sent by the Association to the AAA on June 29, 1979. This 
brief letter, a copy of which was sent by the AAA to McAndrew, 
stated: "As the initiator of the demand for arbitration on behalf 
of the union, I hereby withdraw the demand for arbitration" 
because, "the dispute has been remedied to the satisfaction of the 
union; i.e., the grievant was granted the.sabbatical leave he 
sought". In reaction to that letter, McAndrew wrote to the AAA 
on July 7, 1979 that he wished to pursue the arbitration and a 
hearing was scheduled to consider whether the dispute was arbi-
trable. 
On October 7, 1979, McAndrew asked the Executive Committe 
of the Association to support him at the hearing and, on October 
17, 1979, the Association responded that it would not do so. The 
Association president wrote that as far as the Association was 
concerned the matter had been resolved when McAndrew was granted 
the sabbatical leave. He acknowledged telling McAndrew that he 
had no objection to McAndrew pursuing the arbitration on his own, 
8' K+%^ 
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but subsequently he was told that the contract did not authorize 
McAndrew to do so. He further indicated that if McAndrew were to 
contest, the Association's interpretation of the contract by chal-
lenging it at the arbitration hearing, he would have to do so at 
his own expense. 
The matter came before the arbitrator on January 30, 1980, 
"-and" the- -arbitrator- dismiss e-d "McAndrew-'s claim.—He -did not reach -
the question whether McAndrew, as an individual, could have 
invoked arbitration. His dismissal was based upon his conclusion 
that McAndrew sought to be substituted for the Association in the 
arbitration and that he could not do so because the Association's 
withdrawal-had terminated' the. proceecLing which it had initiated.~ 
At the arbitration hearing, the District had submitted 
the Association's letter of June 4, 1979 to the arbitrator in 
support of its position that the arbitration proceeding had been 
terminated by the Association. McAndrew asserts that he had not 
seen this letter before and that, after reading it, he understood 
for the first time that the'Association and the District had made 
an improper "deal" to sacrifice his interests. About three months 
after the arbitration hearing, he filed the charge herein which 
alleges that the Association violated its duty of fair represen-
tation to him by conspiring with the District to settle his grie-
vance on terms that were not favorable to him. The Association 
1 
moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that it was not timely. 
It argued that McAndrew was aware of all the circumstances relat-
1 Section 204.1(a) of our Rules permits an improper practice 
charge within four months of the conduct complained about. 
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ing to its refusal to bring his grievance to arbitration in July, 
1979. The hearing officer agreed with the Association and dis-
missed the charge. The matter now comes to us on the exceptions 
of McAndrew. 
2 . 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of the 
hearing officer. The Association's letter of June 4, 1979 to the 
AAA, which first came to McAndrew' s. attention on January 30, 1980, 
provided him with no new information relevant to his charge. He 
knew by July 7, 1979, at the latest, that the Association was 
withdrawing its demand for arbitration because it deemed the 
District's granting him a sabbatical leave in 1979-80 to be a 
satisfactory resolution of the grievance. The only other piece 
of information contained in the Association's letter of June 4, 
1979 was that the Association did not think that McAndrew had a 
contractual right to arbitrate his grievance on his own and that 
it objected to'his doing so. This information was communicated 
to McAndrew by the Association in its letter of October 17, 1979. 
The charge that the Association violated its duty of 
fair representation to McAndrew was not filed within four months 
of his receipt of the Association's letter of October 17, 1979 
and is, therefore, not timely. Accordingly, 
i 
2 No hearing was held. The record consists of documents .--
mostly letters. McAndrew was given the opportunity to object 
to the consideration of any of these documents not submitted 
by him, and he offered no objection. 
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WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 3, 1981 
-^4^^^/^y^^^^; 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION BOARD 
i; In the Matter of 
jj ALLEGANY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
jj . Employer, 
ji -and-
Si ALLEGANY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL |! ASSOCIATION, NYEA/NEA, 
(l • . . . • ' . . . • • 
jj -and- . Petitioner, 
|j CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
ii Intervenor-
#3A-2/3/81 
Case No. C-2143 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
I! A representation proceeding having been conducted in' the 
• ij above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
l\ with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act -and the Rules of 
i; Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a'negotiating repre- • 
}\ sentative has'been selected, 
\\ 
l\ Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
if Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
11 IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED, that Allegany Educational Support 
I:Personnel Association, NYEA/NEA 
] j 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
•the above .named public employer',, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations' and the settlement of-
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All noninst Jtional employees.. 
Excluded: All employees in the negotiating unit currently 
represented by the Allegany Central School 
Teachers' Association; all certified personnel 
.... and all classified civil' service supervisory, 
administrative, and managerial employees; School. 
Lunch Manager;' Head .Mechanic; Head Custodian; 
Secretary to.the Superintendent; Account Clerk/ 
Board Treasurer; Secretaries to the Building . 
I; • • • Principals and all employees hired on a temporary 
!^ (less than six "6" months) or on a casual basis.-
H . • • • • • • • • • • . 
\\ Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
l\ shall negotiate collectively with Ailegany Educational Support 
HPersonnel Association, NYEA/NEA 
U • •• • • • 
1;and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
Iiwith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
'jnegotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
!determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
[Signed on the 2nd day of February, 1981 
J Albany, New York . 
^fea^ k 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida KLaps, Member 
PERB 58.3';! 
David C~ Randies,^Member 
